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NAIRU stands for the nonaccelerating inflation rate of
unemployment.  It is beyond dispute that this acronym is an ugly
addition to the English language.  There are, however, two issues
that fail to command consensus among economists, which we address
in this essay.  
The first issue is whether the concept of NAIRU is a useful
piece of business cycle theory.  We believe it is, and we begin
this paper by attempting to explain why.  In our view, the NAIRU is
approximately a synonym for the natural rate of unemployment.  This
concept follows naturally from any theory that says that changes in
monetary policy, and aggregate demand more generally, push
inflation and unemployment in opposite directions in the short run.
Once this short-run tradeoff is admitted, there must be some level
of unemployment consistent with stable inflation.
The second issue is why the NAIRU changes over time and, in
particular, why it fell in the second half of the 1990s.  This
question is more difficult, and the answer is open to debate.  Most
likely, various factors are at work, including demographics and
government policies.  Yet one hypothesis stands out as particularly
promising: fluctuations in the NAIRU appear related to fluctuations
in productivity.  In the 1970s, the NAIRU rose when productivity
growth slowed.  In the 1990s, the NAIRU fell when productivity
growth sped up.  Developing and testing models that explain the
links among inflation, unemployment, and productivity remains a
challenge for students of business cycle theory.2
1. The Role of NAIRU 
The word "NAIRU" entered the language of macroeconomics in the
1970s, a period of rapid and rising inflation.  Yet, in a deeper
sense, the concept has been there all along.
A Building Block of Macroeconomic Theory
A long tradition in economics emphasizes that the supply of
money influences both inflation and unemployment.  In his classic
1752 essay "Of Money," David Hume wrote about the effects of
monetary injections, such as gold discoveries:  "It is easy to
trace the money in its progress through the whole commonwealth;
where we shall find that it must first quicken the diligence of
every individual, before it increases the price of labour."  This
insight has motivated much of modern macroeconomic theory.  Two
prominent examples are Milton Friedman's (1968) presidential
address to the American Economic Association and Robert Lucas's
(1996) Nobel prize lecture.  Lucas quotes exactly these words from
Hume.
At times, some economists have questioned Hume's insight.  The
real business cycle theorists of the 1980s, for example, suggested
that business cycles were technologically driven and that money had
no role in explaining production and employment fluctuations
(Prescott 1986; Long and Plosser 1983).  But this view is a
minority position, both historically and today.  There is wide
agreement about the fundamental insight that monetary fluctuations
push inflation and unemployment in opposite directions.  That is,3
society faces a tradeoff, at least in the short run, between
inflation and unemployment.  
According to conventional macroeconomic theory, the inflation-
unemployment tradeoff is central to understanding not only the
effects of monetary policy but also other policies and events that
influence the aggregate demand for goods and services.  But most of
these other events and policies can potentially have effects
through other channels as well.  For example, tax policy influences
both aggregate demand through disposable income and aggregate
supply through work incentives.  By contrast, belief that monetary
policy has employment effects is inextricably tied to belief in the
inflation-unemployment tradeoff.
 Two centuries have passed since Hume penned the wise words
quoted above, but the economics profession has yet to reach a
consensus about why this tradeoff arises. In classical theory,
money is neutral.  It is only the numeraire in which prices are
quoted.  Changes in its quantity should affect the overall price
level, but not relative prices, production, or employment.  The key
question facing business cycle theorists is why this classical
theorem of monetary neutrality fails to hold in the world.
Many answers have been proposed.  Short-run nonneutrality has
been blamed on imperfections of information (Friedman 1968; Lucas
1973; Mankiw and Reis 2001); long-term labor contracts (Fischer
1977; Gray 1976; Taylor 1980); the costs of price adjustment
(Rotemberg 1982; Mankiw 1985; Blanchard and Kiyotaki 1987; Ball and
Romer, 1990); or departures from full rationality (Akerlof and4
Yellen 1985).  Each of these approaches raises its own set of
difficult theoretical and empirical questions, which are beyond the
scope of this essay.  There is, however, a common theme: because of
some market imperfection absent from the classical model, changes
in the value of the unit of account matter.  Monetary neutrality
breaks down, and at least in the short run, monetary changes have
opposite effects on inflation and unemployment. 
Without much loss of generality, we can write the short-run
tradeoff between inflation B and unemployment U as follows:
B = k - a U
where k and a>0 are parameters.  This equation does not really say
much, other than that B and U are negatively related.  One fact
about this relationship is clear: it cannot be constant over time.
If it were, the data on inflation and unemployment would trace a
nice, stable, downward-sloping Phillips curve.  There once was a
time when some economists took this possibility seriously, but data
since the early 1970s have made this simple view untenable.  
The instability of this relationship is hardly a surprise.
Even Samuelson and Solow's (1960) classic discussion of the
Phillips curve suggested that the short-run menu of inflation-
unemployment combinations would likely shift over time.  Skeptics
are sometimes tempted to use the shifting Phillips curve as
evidence to deny the existence of a short-run tradeoff.  This is
pure sophistry.  It would be like observing that the United States5
has more consumption and investment than India to deny that society
faces a tradeoff between consumption and investment.  The situation
is not hard to understand and, in fact, arises frequently in
economics.  At any point in time, society faces a tradeoff, but the
tradeoff changes over time.  The next question is what factors
cause the tradeoff to shift.
Expectations, the Natural Rate, and Supply Shocks
Since Friedman (1968) and Phelps's (1967,1968) seminal
contributions, one variable has played center stage in explaining
shifts in the inflation-unemployment tradeoff: expected inflation.
Other things equal, an increase in expected inflation is associated
with an equal increase in actual inflation.  The reason why
expected inflation plays such a role depends on the theory of
short-run nonneutrality,  Moreover, the choice of theory will
influence the timing of when expectations are formed.  But from a
birds' eye view, the similarity of the theories is more significant
than their differences.  In most standard theories, we can write
the inflation-unemployment tradeoff as
B = B
e - a(U-U*)
where Be is expected inflation and U* is a parameter called the
"natural rate of unemployment."  The natural rate is the rate of
unemployment that prevails when inflation expectations are
confirmed.  Seen in another light, the parameter U* imbeds all6
shifts in the inflation-unemployment tradeoff previously
represented by the parameter k, other than shifts arising from
expected inflation. 
The natural rate can be viewed as the unemployment rate that
the economy reaches in the long.  This interpretation arises from
imposing a modicum of rationality to expectations.  Over any long
interval of time, the average of expected inflation should equal
the average of actual inflation; otherwise, forecasts are
systematically biased.  Thus, over the same long interval, average
unemployment should equal the average natural rate.  In the long
run, U cannot deviate from U*.
None of this means that the natural rate of unemployment is
immutable, or even that it moves only slowly over time.  In
principle, U* can exhibit substantial high-frequency variation, so
any other shift in the inflation-unemployment tradeoff can be
described as a shift in U*.  As a practical matter, however, the
literature on inflation-unemployment dynamics has traditionally
used an amended version of the above equation:
B = Be - a(U-U*) + v
where v is dubbed the "supply shock."  
To some extent, the distinction between U* and v is arbitrary:
both the natural rate U* and the supply shock v represent shifts in
the inflation-unemployment tradeoff.  But many economists view
these two variables as measuring different kinds of shifts.  The     1 For our attempt to derive a theory of the supply shock v,
see Ball and Mankiw (1995).
7
natural rate U* is thought to reflect how well the labor market
matches workers and job.  It is altered by, for instance, by
changes in demographics or labor-market institutions and is thought
to move slowly over time.  By contrast, the supply shock v reflects
disruptions in the normal inflation process, such as that caused by
an oil embargo or a change in the exchange rate.  The supply shock
is thought to exhibit more high-frequency variation than the
natural rate.1
    To implement this equation, something has to be said about how
expectations are formed.  One approach is to assume adaptive
expectations, according to which expected inflation is a weighted
average of past inflation.  The simplest version is to posit that
expected inflation equals last period's inflation: B
e=B-1.  The
inflation-unemployment tradeoff then becomes:
B = B-1  - a(U-U*) + v.
The rational expectations revolution was founded precisely on
criticizing this approach.  (Lucas 1972; Sargent 1971)  And surely,
it would be indefensible to accept adaptive expectations as a
precise and immutable description of the world, regardless of the
monetary regime.  But over the past four decades, the assumption of
adaptive expectations may not be so bad.  Inflation has been close
to a random walk during this period (Barsky 1987; Ball 2000).8
Forecasting future inflation with past inflation, as is assumed by
adaptive expectations, is not far from rational.  In this
environment, U* can be viewed as the NAIRU, the unemployment rate
at which inflation will be stable, absent the high-frequency shocks
represented by v.  
One implication of this analysis is that the value of the
NAIRU concept depends on the monetary regime.  If we lived in a
world where inflation was close to white noise, rather than highly
persistent, then adaptive expectations would be a bad approximation
to optimal behavior.  The early part of the twentieth century, when
the United States operated under a gold standard, may have been
such a regime. (Barsky, 1987)  In that world, expected inflation
would be closer to a constant of zero, and the natural rate U*
would be associated with stable prices rather than stable
inflation. 
In the U.S. monetary regime of recent decades, however, the
NAIRU concept is useful, and it is synonymous with the natural rate
of unemployment.  In his classic paper introducing the natural-rate
hypothesis, Friedman described the situation as follows:
"There is always a temporary tradeoff between inflation and
unemployment; there is no permanent tradeoff. The temporary
tradeoff comes not from inflation per se, but from unanticipated
inflation, which generally means, from a rising rate of inflation."
Friedman didn't use the term "NAIRU," but the concept is implicit9
in his analysis.
Hysteresis
Some economists have suggested that the labor market exhibits
a form of "hysteresis" (Blanchard and Summers, 1986).  In physics,
hysteresis refers to the failure of an object to return to its
original value after being changed by an external force, even after
the force is removed.  In the labor market, a similar phenomenon
would arise if the natural rate U* depended on past unemployment U.
In this case, a change in aggregate demand would first influence
unemployment by causing U to deviate from U*, but then would have
a persistent effect on unemployment as U* changed.  
Several theories have been proposed to explain why this might
be the case.  The most popular emphasize long-lasting damage
suffered by workers who experience unemployment.  These workers
lose human capital, become less attractive to employers, and reduce
their job search as they become accustomed to being unemployed
(Layard et al., 1991).  All these effects make workers less likely
to be employed in the future.  A recession that raises unemployment
leaves a permanent scar on the economy, as U* is higher even after
the initial shock that caused the recession has disappeared.  These
theories of hysterisis were first developed to explain the large
rise in the NAIRU in Europe during the 1980s: The increase in U*
came immediately after the disinflationary recession that started2  For a recent study using hysteresis theories to explain the
increase in the European NAIRU, see Ball (1999).  For an attempt
to explain the European NAIRU based on labor-market institutions
and supply-side shocks, see Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
3 For two examples from this large literature, see Gordon (1998)
and Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997).
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the decade.2
The validity of hysteresis theories is a subject of some
controversy, and we will not take up that debate here.  Regardless
of how this debate is resolved, the concept of NAIRU remains valid.
At any point in time, there will be an unemployment rate consistent
with stable inflation, which can be called the NAIRU.  Hysteresis
theories merely give one reason to expect the NAIRU to change over
time.  As we discuss below, there are many other reasons to expect
that the NAIRU will not be a constant. 
Two Econometric Difficulties
Let us now turn from theory to econometric implementation.  A
large literature has attempted to estimate inflation equations of
this form:
B = B-1 - a(U-U*) + v.
Often, the studies includes additional lags of inflation or
unemployment.  Sometimes, rather than leaving the supply shock v
entirely in a residual, control variables are included, such as
food and oil prices, exchange rates, and dummies for wage-price
controls.
3
One difficult issue that this literature has tried to skirt is
the identification problem.  If the macroeconometrican assumes that11
U* is constant over the interval being studied and that v is
contemporaneously uncorrelated with U, then this equation can be
consistently estimated with ordinary least squares.  The value of
the NAIRU, U*, can then be inferred from the estimated parameters.
These identification assumptions are not at all innocuous.  It
is easy to imagine that the supply shocks represented by v are
correlated with unemployment.  For example, a burst in productivity
growth, such as that experienced during the late 1990s, might well
lower inflation and unemployment.  The textbook solution to this
problem is to find instrumental variables that are correlated with
unemployment but uncorrelated with the supply shock.  In practice,
finding valid instruments is hard to do and rarely done.
Note that other strands of the literature make somewhat
different identification assumptions.  Lucas's (1973) classic paper
on inflation-output tradeoffs used nominal GDP growth as the-right-
hand side variable in a regression estimated with ordinary least
squares.  The implicit assumption was that the supply shocks in the
residual do not influence nominal GDP, but can influence both real
GDP and the price level in opposite directions.  Similarly, Barro's
(1977) classic work on unanticipated money implicitly assumed that
supply shocks do not influence money growth.  These identification
schemes can also be questioned.  Below we follow the traditional
identification assumption, according to which the supply shock v is
contemporaneously uncorrelated with unemployment U.  Dealing with
the identification problem in a more satisfactory way seems an
important avenue for future research.12
A second, more tractable econometric issue is the computation
of standard errors.  Until recently, the empirical literature on
the Phillips curve rarely provided standard errors for estimates of
the NAIRU.  This odd oversight was corrected in an important paper
by Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997).  Using a conventional
specification, they estimated the NAIRU in 1990 to be 6.2 percent,
with a 95 percent confidence interval from 5.1 to 7.7 percent.
This is a large range.  In principle, better measures of supply
shocks can reduce the residual variance and improve the precision
of NAIRU estimates.  But Staiger, Stock, and Watson showed that
given standard specifications used in the literature, the NAIRU is
not estimated precisely.
Its Use in Policy
How should monetary policymakers use the NAIRU?  Most
obviously, it is a forecasting tool.  When unemployment is below
the NAIRU, inflation can be expected to rise, and when it is above
the NAIRU, inflation can be expected to fall.  Thus, even if the
policy regime were one of inflation targeting, monetary
policymakers should keep an eye on unemployment and the NAIRU.
It may be tempting to point to the experience of the 1990s to
suggest that this view is obsolete.  And, indeed, as we discuss
below, there is evidence that the late 1990s were different: the
NAIRU declined substantially.  But it would be rash to suggest that
the NAIRU is obsolete as a forecasting tool.  Stock and Watson
(1999) offer a comprehensive study of various methods for13
forecasting inflation.  Despite the finding of Staiger, Stock, and
Watson (1997) that the NAIRU is imprecisely estimated, Stock and
Watson (1999) report, "Inflation forecasts produced by the Phillips
curve generally have been more accurate than forecasts based on
other macroeconomic variables, including interest rates, money, and
commodity prices."
Nonetheless, it also makes sense for monetary policymakers to
give some weight to other forecasting tools.  When looking ahead to
future inflation, they should also look at, for example, the
consensus of private forecasters and the spread between real and
nominal bond yields.  Of course, these tools themselves reflect the
NAIRU concept, because private forecasts of inflation are often
based on it.  Using such private forecasts of inflation for
policymaking can be viewed as a way to decentralize the
decisionmaking over how the NAIRU is changing over time.
2. The U.S. NAIRU, 1960-2000
So much for theory.  Let's now turn to the practical question:
what is the level of the NAIRU for the U.S. economy?  
An Approach
     To see how one might estimate the NAIRU, rewrite the Phillips-
curve equation as
        )B  =  aU* - aU + v .14
If one assumes that U* is constant and that U is uncorrelated with
v, then the value of U* can be estimated by regressing the change
in inflation )B on a constant and unemployment U.  The ratio of the
constant term (aU*) to the absolute value of the unemployment
coefficient (a) is an estimate of U*.  When we perform this
exercise for annual U.S. data from 1960 to 2000, measuring
inflation with the consumer price index, we obtain a constant term
of 3.8 and an unemployment coefficient of -0.63.  This yields a
NAIRU estimate of 6.1 percent.
However, many economists have questioned the assumption of a
constant NAIRU underlying this calculation, especially since the
apparent fall in the NAIRU in the late 1990s.  There is a growing
literature that seeks to estimate the path of a time-varying NAIRU.
This literature is based on the idea, discussed above, that
movements in U* are long-term shifts in the unemployment-inflation
relation, while the shock v captures short-run fluctuations.
Authors such as Staiger et al. and Gordon (1998) estimate U* by
positing a stochastic process for U* (such as a random walk) and a
stochastic process for v (such as white noise) and then using a
statistical procedure that separates Phillips-curve shifts into
these two kinds of shocks.  To build intuition, we use an approach
that is simpler but yields similar results.
Suppose for the moment that we know the value of the parameter
a, which gives the slope of the unemployment-inflation tradeoff. We
can then rearrange to obtain the equation15
    U* + v/a = U + )B/a.
The right-hand side can be computed from the data, yielding an
estimate of U* + v/a, which measures the shifts in the Phillips
curve.  Within this sum, U* represents the longer-term trends, and
v/a is proportional to the shorter-term supply shocks.  It is
therefore natural to try to extract U* from U* + v/a using a
standard approach to estimating the trend in a series.
We use the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick and Prescott,
1997).  The HP filter is a generalization of a linear time trend
that allows the slope of the trend to change gradually over time.
Formally, the HP filter minimizes the sum of squared deviations
between the trend and the actual series, with a penalty for
curvature that keeps the trend smooth.  If there were no penalty,
the filter would yield the original series; if the penalty were
very high, it would yield a linear time trend.
     To implement this procedure, we must choose two parameters.
The first is the Phillips curve slope, a.  In our results below, we
use an a of 0.63, the slope coefficient obtained from regressing )B
on unemployment and a constant.  This value is consistent with
conventional wisdom about the costs of disinflation (it implies
that reducing inflation by one percentage point produces 1/0.63 =
1.6 point-years of unemployment).  Reasonable variation in the
assumed coefficient has little effect on our conclusions.
     The other parameter is the smoothing parameter in the HP
filter--the weight that the procedure gives to keeping the16
estimated U* smooth rather than fitting every movement in U*+(v/a).
The choice of this parameter is largely arbitrary.  In some ways,
this is not surprising: as we noted earlier, the distinction
between U* and v is not well-defined.  Most economists have the
intuition that movements in U* are "smooth" and that v represents
a different kind of high-frequency shift in the Phillips curve, but
this intuition is too vague to have much practical import.  In the
analysis below, we experiment with alternative values of the HP
smoothing parameter.
Results
    Figure 1 presents estimates of the U.S. NAIRU over the last
forty years.  The solid line gives the values of U*+(v/a) computed
as described above; this represents the sum of long-term and
transitory shifts in the inflation-unemployment tradeoff.  The two
dashed lines give smoothed versions of the series that serve as our
estimates of U*.  The two versions correspond to different values
of the HP smoothing parameter: one value is 100, the most commonly-
used value with annual data, and the other is 1000, which imposes
greater smoothing as advocated by some researchers (e.g., Roberts,
1998).
     The two smoothed series tell broadly similar stories.  The
NAIRU has followed a hump-shaped path: it trended up from the 1960s
until about 1980, then peaked and has declined since then.  With
the smaller smoothing parameter, there is a small dip in the early
1960s before U* starts to rise, but this wiggle does not survive17
with greater smoothing.  More generally, the movements in U* are
smaller with the higher HP parameter.  With a parameter of 1000,
the estimated NAIRU is 5.4 percent in 1960, peaks at 6.8 percent in
1979, and falls to 4.9 percent in 2000.  These results are broadly
similar to those of Gordon and Staiger et al.  The apparent
increase in the NAIRU before 1980 and decline thereafter has been
widely recognized.  These movements have motivated papers with
titles such as "Why Is Unemployment So Very High..." in the 1980s
(Summers, 1986), and as "Why Has Unemployment Fallen" more recently
(Shimer, 1998).
     While there is a consensus that the NAIRU fell during the
1980s and 1990s, this consensus took some time to develop.  The
falling NAIRU was initially obscured by the run-up of actual
unemployment in the recession of the early 1990s.  Starting in the
mid-1990s, many authors pointed out a run of favorable shifts in
the Phillips curve, but these were sometimes interpreted as
transitory supply shocks--that is, decreases in U*+(v/a) were
interpreted as movements in v rather than U*.  This interpretation
was supported by direct evidence of favorable shocks during the
period 1995-98, such as a fall in energy prices and a strengthening
of the exchange rate, which reduced import prices (see, e.g.,
Gordon, 1998).  Yet the period after 1998 did not see additional
favorable shocks, and indeed energy prices moved back up.  Because
unemployment was low through 2000 without accelerating inflation,
a consensus emerged that the NAIRU had fallen.
     On the other hand, the magnitude of the NAIRU decrease is hard18
to estimate.  As illustrated above, it depends on an arbitrary
decision about how much to smooth the NAIRU series.  The precise
timing of movements in the NAIRU is also unclear.  Our estimated
movements are smooth, with the decrease occurring slowly over
almost two decades.  Yet this is an artifact of our smoothing
procedure.  A number of authors have suggested that the NAIRU was
fairly constant from the 1980s to the mid-90s, and then fell
sharply in the late-90s "New Economy."  Perhaps this is true, and
our procedure artificially smooths out the fall in U*.  There are
limits to how much how one can learn about the NAIRU from
unemployment and inflation data alone.
3. The Falling NAIRU: A More Employable Labor Force?
     Many authors have sought to explain the movements in the U.S.
NAIRU.  This section and the next review some of the leading
hypotheses, with a focus on those that might explain the declining
NAIRU of the 1990s.  Some of these theories also help explain the
earlier NAIRU increase.
We begin in this section by reviewing stories that focus on
the changing composition of the labor force.  Economists have long
recognized that unemployment rates are different for different
kinds of workers, depending for example on their skills and their
intensity of job search.  Thus, changes in the sizes of groups with
relatively high or low rates of unemployment can change the
aggregate unemployment rate, even without changes in the rate for
any individual group.  In recent years, a number of authors have19
suggested changes in the labor force that reduce aggregate
unemployment by reducing the sizes of high-unemployment groups.
Older Workers
     The most obvious reason the labor force changes is
demographics.  In seeking to explain the evolution of the NAIRU, a
number of authors point to a particular type of shift: the changing
age structure as the baby boom generation has moved through the
labor force.  The proportion of the labor force aged 16-24 rose
from 17 percent in 1960 to 24 percent in 1978 as the baby boomers
entered the labor force as young workers, and this percentage fell
to 16 percent in 2000 as the boomers have aged.  These trends are
potentially important because young workers have higher
unemployment rates than older workers: over 1960-2000, the average
unemployment rate was 12.2 percent for workers 16-24 and 4.4
percent for workers 25+.  Gordon has argued that the increase in
young workers accounts for much of the increase in the NAIRU before
1980, and Shimer (1998) argues that the recent decrease explains
much of the NAIRU fall.
     The classic method for measuring the effects of demographic
changes is to compute a "Perry-weighted" unemployment rate (Perry,
1970; Katz and Krueger,  1998).  This is a weighted average of
unemployment rates for different demographic groups with fixed
weights; by contrast, the usual aggregate unemployment rate has
weights equal to labor-force shares, which change over time.  A
time series for Perry-weighted unemployment shows what would have     4 The Perry-weighting procedure assumes that demographics
affect labor force shares but not the unemployment rates of
individual groups.  This assumption has been questioned by Shimer
(1998, 2001), who discusses a number of channels through which
changing supplies of old and young workers can affect their
unemployment rates.  Shimer's 1998 paper argues that a younger
labor force raises unemployment among the young, but his 2001
paper argues that it reduces unemployment for both age groups. 
If the later paper is correct, then differences between Perry-
weighted and standard unemployment rates give an upper bound on
the effects of demographics. 
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happened to the unemployment rate given the evolution of each
group's unemployment if the sizes of groups did not change.    
     Following Staiger et el. (2001), we compute Perry-weighted
unemployment based on 14 age-sex groups, with weights based on
average labor-force shares over 1960-2000.  We then compute our
estimates of the time-varying NAIRU from unemployment and inflation
data using the same method as in Figure 1 -- but using the Perry-
weighted unemployment series.  Figure 2 shows the resulting series
(based on an HP smoothing parameter of 1000), along with the
corresponding series based on the standard unemployment rate; the
differences between the two series show the impact of demographics.
The Figure shows that this impact has been modest.  The hump-shaped
pattern of the NAIRU remains after Perry-weighting, although it is
dampened: the increase from 1960 to the peak and the decrease to
2000 are 0.9 points and 1.3 points respectively, compared to 1.4
and 1.9 with the standard unemployment rate.  Thus the broad trends
in the NAIRU remain to be explained even after one adjusts for
demographics.4 21
Disability and Incarceration 
     The labor force can also change if government policies cause
people to leave it.  The aggregate unemployment rate falls if the
labor-force leavers are workers who otherwise would have high
unemployment rates.  Recent work has noted two policy shifts that
work in this direction: the rising rate of incarceration (Katz and
Krueger, 1999) and the greater generosity of disability insurance
(Autor and Duggan, 2001).  People who are removed from the labor
force by being locked up or through certification of disability are
likely to have experienced high unemployment rates while in the
labor force.
     Of these two factors, disability appears more important.  The
percentage of non-elderly adults receiving government disability
insurance has risen steadily from 3.1 percent in 1984 to 5.3
percent in 2000.  Autor and Duggan attribute this rise to reduced
stringency in the screening of applicants and to a higher income-
replacement ratio.  They estimate the impact on unemployment by
examining the effects of variation in the disability program across
states.  They find that the total effect of changes in the program
has been to reduce aggregate unemployment by 0.65 percentage points
from 1984 to 2000.
     Katz and Krueger have observed that lower unemployment can
reflect greater incarceration.  However, while incarceration rates
rose dramatically in the 1990s, the effect on aggregate
unemployment was modest.  Katz and Krueger estimate that this
factor produced a total decrease in unemployment of 0.17 percentage22
points.
     Adding the effects of disability and incarceration yields a
total reduction in unemployment of roughly 0.8 percentage points.
This is a bit more than half of the decrease in the NAIRU in Figure
2 when unemployment is Perry-weighted.  However, recall that the
estimated fall in the NAIRU is larger if the HP smoothing parameter
is set lower than 1000, in which case disability and incarceration
can explain a smaller fraction of the decline. 
     The likely role of a changing labor force in explaining the
NAIRU decrease depends on the timing of the decrease.  As we
discussed above, some economists suggest that the NAIRU fell
sharply since 1995, although the aggregate data are also consistent
with a gradual decrease since the early 1980s.  If there was in
fact a sharp shift from 1995 to 2000, the factors discussed so far
cannot be the main explanation.  The changes in disability benefits
and incarceration are long-term trends, and only a small part of
the changes have occurred after 1995.  And the aging of the labor
force was almost complete by 1995: the percentage aged 16-24
reached a trough of 15.8% in 1997 and has since risen slightly.
The difference between Perry-weighted and standard unemployment
rates fell only 0.2 points from 1992 to 2000.  If the NAIRU fell
significantly in the late 90s, we must look beyond the nature of
the labor force to find the explanation.  This brings us to another
set of theories.     5 In addition to the stories we mention, some people have
noted declines in unionization and the real minimum wage, and
welfare reform.  There appears to be a consensus, however, that
these are not major factors.  Changes in unionization and minimum
wages were modest in the 1990s.  Welfare reform affected a
sizable number of workers -- roughly one million women have left
the welfare rolls since 1994.  However, most of these women were
out of the labor force while on welfare.  By joining the labor
force, they are likely to have raised the unemployment rate
slightly, because the incidence of unemployment is higher for
them than for the average worker.
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4. The Falling NAIRU: A New Economy?
     The NAIRU can change not only because of changes in the labor
force, but also because of broader changes in the economy.  In the
second half of the 1990s, many observers alleged the advent of a
"New Economy"--one with new technologies, higher productivity
growth, increased "competitiveness," and so on.  If one believes
that the NAIRU fell significantly in the period after 1995, it is
natural to suspect a link between this fact and the broader changes
in the economy.  We now discuss several leading stories along these
lines.5
Greater Openness to Trade
     One story about the favorable Phillips curve shift is that it
resulted from the "globalization" of the U.S. economy -- the
greater openness to foreign trade (see, for example, Thurow
[1998]).  This argument starts with the fact that foreign trade has
become more important in the United States in recent decades: the
ratios of imports and exports to GDP have trended up.  Some
observers argue that this integration into the world economy has
subjected U.S. firms to greater competition.  This in turn is anti-24
inflationary: even if unemployment is low, firms cannot raise
prices aggressively because consumers will switch to foreign
suppliers.  In mainstream terminology, this means that the NAIRU
has fallen.
     Many journalists have picked up on this idea, but it has
largely been ignored by academic economists.  And they have ignored
it, we believe, for good reason.  The theoretical logic of the
story is questionable, but the main problem is empirical.  The U.S.
has become more open in the last decade, with the import-GDP ratio
rising from 11 percent in 1990 to 15 percent in 2000.  But this is
not a feature of the New Economy but rather a continuation of a
trend through most of the period since World War II.  The import-
GDP ratio was 5 percent in 1950.  If greater openness produces
lower unemployment, we should have seen a steady downward trend in
the NAIRU for the last 50 years, and this hasn't occurred.  Indeed,
the decade with the largest increase in the import-GDP ratio was
the 1970s, and as shown in Figure 1, this decade saw a substantial
increase in the NAIRU.
Better Job Matching
     One reason for unemployment is job turnover.  When workers
move from jobs that disappear to those that open up, the process
creates unemployment because it takes workers time to find new
jobs.  Several authors suggest that this process improved in the
1990s, leading to lower unemployment.
     The most common version of this story focuses on the growth in25
the temporary-help industry (e.g. Katz and Krueger; Cohen et al.,
2001).  The percentage of workers employed by temporary-help firms,
such as Manpower Inc., rose from 1.1% in 1989 to 2.2% in 1998.
This suggests that an increasing number of workers who are between
permanent jobs are employed as temps rather than unemployed.  In
addition, temp jobs sometimes turn into permanent jobs, so temp
agencies help speed up the process of permanent job matching.
     However, when researchers try to quantify the effects of temp
agencies on unemployment, the results are disappointing.  Both Katz
and Krueger and Staiger et al.(2001) examine the relation across
states between unemployment and the size of the temp industry.
Katz and Krueger estimate that the growth of the temp industry in
the 1990s reduced aggregate unemployment by anywhere from zero to
0.4 percentage points.  Staiger et al. fail to find a robust
relation between the temp industry and unemployment rates.  Thus,
stories about the falling NAIRU based on the temp industry remain
speculative at best.
     It is possible that the process of job matching improved in
ways beyond the growth of the temp industry.  Cohen et al. (2001)
suggest that the New Economy features production processes that put
a greater emphasis on general rather than specific skills.  As a
result, workers have become more interchangeable, making it easier
to match workers and jobs and thereby reducing unemployment.  As
evidence for this idea, Cohen et al. cite the management literature
and interviews with human resource managers.  It is an open
question, however, whether this phenomenon has had a sizable effect26
on the aggregate unemployment rate.
The Productivity Acceleration
     A central feature of the New Economy of the late 1990s was a
rise in the growth rate of labor productivity.  Average growth in
output per hour of work was 1.5 percent over 1974-1995 and rose to
2.6 percent over 1996-2000.  Most explanations of this change focus
on the increased use of computers and the internet (for example,
see the Symposium on productivity growth in JEP, Fall 2000).  For
our purposes, a key fact about the productivity acceleration is
that it started in the mid-90s, around the same time that
researchers started detecting a decline in the NAIRU.  This
coincidence suggests a link between the two phenomena.
     Such a link is also suggested by the experience of the 1970s.
This was the beginning of the infamous "productivity slowdown":
average productivity growth fell to its 1974-95 average of 1.5
percent after an average of 3.3 percent over 1948-73.  As discussed
above, the 1970s were also a period of a rising NAIRU.  If there is
a link between shifts in productivity growth and in the NAIRU, it
may help explain both the rising NAIRU of the 1970s and the falling
NAIRU of the 1990s.
     Such a link was suggested by students of the rising NAIRU in
the 1970s, notably Grubb et. al (1982) and Braun (1984).  These
authors present a particular explanation for the link, one resting
on the idea that "wage aspirations" adjust slowly to shifts in
productivity growth.  The concept of wage aspirations is a     
6 Of course, a more classical story linking productivity and
employment is the real business cycle theory of Long and Plosser
(1983) and Prescott (1986).  For a critique, see Mankiw (1989).
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departure from the neoclassical theory of the labor market, but it
builds on research by psychologists and industrial-relations
specialists.  The story goes as follows.6
     In a steady state with constant growth of labor productivity,
the growth of real wages is determined by the growth of
productivity, as suggested by neoclassical theory (and empirical
evidence).  In such a situation, workers come to view the rate of
real-wage increase that they receive as normal and fair, and to
expect it to continue.  If productivity growth falls, as in the
1970s, fundamentals dictate that real-wage growth must fall as
well.  Workers resist this decrease, however; they try to maintain
the wage increases to which they are accustomed.  To the extent
that workers have some influence over wages, this means that wage
setters will try to achieve real-wage increases above the level
that can be sustained by productivity growth.  This mismatch
between real-wage aspirations and productivity growth worsens the
inflation-unemployment tradeoff.  In other words, the NAIRU rises.
     This story received attention in the early 1980s and then
faded from prominence.  It has been resurrected in the last few
years, as many economists have noticed the parallel between the
1970s and the 1990s.  Today's version of the story reverses the
signs.  Productivity has accelerated but workers have become
accustomed to the slow wage growth since the 1970s.  A mismatch of
productivity and wage aspirations in this direction shifted the     
7 The shifts in the Phillips curve that occur in this story
are eventually reversed when wage aspirations adjust to the new
rate of productivity growth.  This creates some ambiguity about
the right way to describe the shifts.  As we discussed earlier,
the Phillips curve can move because of either a transitory
"supply shock" or a change in the NAIRU, and the distinction
between the two is based on a fuzzy notion of persistence.  Since
a Phillips-curve shift caused by a productivity speedup
eventually goes away, one might call it a supply shock.  We
prefer to call it a change in the NAIRU, however, because the
shift can last for many years.  In particular, it lasts long
enough to influence the NAIRU series in Figure 1, which filters
out the year-to-year effects of supply shocks.  
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Phillips curve favorably.  This story is told, for example, by
Blinder (2000), DeLong (2000), and the 2000 Economic Report of the
President.7
     Following Staiger et al. (2001) and Ball and Moffitt (2001),
we examine data on unemployment and productivity growth to see
whether they fit the story.  Figure 3 shows the NAIRU series from
Figure 1; again there are two versions corresponding to different
smoothing parameters.  The Figure also shows the trend in
productivity growth, obtained with the HP filter and with the same
smoothing parameters used to create the NAIRU series.  Productivity
growth is shown on an inverted scale to make it easier to see the
negative comovement between the two trends.  One can see broadly
similar patterns in the two trends, although the match between them
is far from perfect.
     One important subtlety is that the rate of productivity growth
is not exactly the relevant variable in the story discussed above.
In a steady state, wage aspirations adjust to any growth rate.
What causes a Phillips-curve shift is a change in productivity
growth, because aspirations are tied to wage growth and hence     8 If we denote productivity growth by g, the productivity
variable in Figure 4 is g - (1-b)[g(-1) + bg(-2) + b2g(-3) +
...].  That is, the weighted average of past productivity growth
in the expression has exponentially declining weights.  The
parameter b, which gives the rate of decline, is set at 0.95. 
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productivity growth in the past.  Therefore, following Ball and
Moffitt (2001), we examine the gap between current productivity
growth and a long moving average of past growth (one that depends
on productivity growth into the distant past, but with greater
weight on recent observations).  This gap, like other variables in
the Figures, is smoothed with the HP filter to extract a trend.
Figure 4 graphs this trend along with our NAIRU series.  Here, the
comovement is closer than when we examine the pure productivity
growth rate.8
     Two details of these graphs deserve notice.  First, our
inverted gap variable peaks in the early 80s and starts declining,
as does the NAIRU.  This occurs even though, as shown in the
previous figure, actual productivity growth does not accelerate
until the 1990s.  This suggests an effect discussed by Stiglitz
(1997): a catchup of wage aspirations to the productivity slowdown.
In Stiglitz's story, the ongoing experience of the productivity
slowdown caused wage aspirations to fall slowly, so the gap between
aspirations and productivity narrowed over the slow-growth era.
This narrowing caused the NAIRU to start falling; the fall was then
magnified when productivity growth accelerated.
   A related point is that the trend in our gap variable falls to
its lowest level at the end of our sample -- as does the NAIRU,
enhancing the fit of the two series.  In contrast, productivity     9 For example, Louis Uchitelle (2000) discusses "the concern
that low unemployment drives up wages and, in turn, prices."  In
explaining why inflation has not risen, he points to
"improvements in productivity, effectively giving employers more
revenue to pay for raises without raising prices."  Uchitelle
attributes this idea to Alan Greenspan.
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growth rises at the end of the sample, but is still below its level
in the 1960s.  That is, what is special about the New Economy of
the late 1990s is not the rate of productivity growth, which was
higher thirty years before, but the increase relative to the recent
past.  The high productivity growth of the sixties was a
continuation of high growth since World War II; wage aspirations
had largely adjusted, so there was little effect on the Phillips
curve.  In contrast, the Phillips curve shifted favorably in the
late 1990s because of the combination of high contemporaneous
growth and low growth in the preceding two decades.
     The productivity-based explanation for the declining NAIRU is
related to a common explanation in the popular press.  In
explaining why inflation failed to accelerate in the late 1990s
despite low unemployment, many journalists cite the productivity
acceleration.  Their story goes as follows.  According to the
Phillips curve, low unemployment puts upward pressure on wage
growth, which feeds into inflation.  Low unemployment has led to
more rapid wage growth.  However, the productivity acceleration has
reduced firms' costs, offsetting the increases from rapid wage
growth.  Because overall costs have not accelerated, inflation has
not had to rise.
9
     This story has common-sense appeal.  It does not contain any     10 The productivity hypothesis is also somewhat related to
another popular story: Alan Greenspan (1997) has suggested that
workers, cowed by job insecurity, lacked aggressiveness in wage
negotiations.  As discussed by Katz and Krueger (1999), there is
no evidence to support an exogenous shift in workers' perceptions
of job security.  But what matters is aggressiveness of wage
seekers relative to productivity growth.  Failure to increase
aggressiveness when productivity accelerates has the same effect
on the NAIRU as an exogenous decrease in aggressiveness.
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explicit role for slow adjustment of wage aspirations, but such a
role is in fact implicit.  In a neoclassical world, a rise in
productivity growth has no obvious effect on inflation, because
higher productivity is reflected fully in higher real wages.  The
idea that a productivity acceleration reduces firm' costs depends
on the implicit assumption that wages do not adjust fully to
productivity movements.  Thus the idea of slowly-adjusting wage
aspirations provides an underpinning for a common journalistic
explanation for the recent experience.10
5. The Beveridge Curve
   In analyzing the labor market, a complement to the Phillips
curve is the Beveridge curve, which has recently been emphasized by
Blanchard and Diamond (1989).  The Beveridge curve shows the
relationships between unemployment (workers without jobs) and
vacancies (jobs without workers).  The Beveridge curve slopes
downward in unemployment-vacancy space because an economic
expansion that reduces unemployment also raises vacancies, as firms
have trouble finding workers in a tighter labor market.
     Like the Phillips curve, the Beveridge curve appears to shift
over time.  Figure 5 plots unemployment and job-vacancy rates for     
11 Cohen et al. stop in 1998 because the rise of internet
advertising makes the newspaper help-wanted index an unreliable
measure of vacancies in recent years.
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annual U.S. data from 1960 through 1998.  The vacancy series is
taken from Cohen et al. (2001), who, following Abraham (1987),
estimate the level of vacancies based on help-wanted advertising in
newspapers.  In the figure, there appear to be stable Beveridge
curves with different intercepts in different periods.  The
Beveridge curve shifted outward from the period 1960-69 to the
period 1975-85, and shifted sharply inward after 1990.  This
pattern of an unfavorable shift in the 1970s and a favorable shift
in the 1990s corresponds to the broad pattern of Phillips-curve
shifts, as measured by time-varying NAIRU estimates.11
     These facts suggest that movements in the Phillips curve and
the Beveridge curve are linked.  A number of authors, including
Katz and Krueger and Cohen et al., argue that such a link helps
isolate the right explanation for the recent fall in the NAIRU --
in particular, that it points towards stories about improved job
matching.  In theoretical work, the Beveridge curve is often
derived from search models of the labor market, where frictions in
matching jobs and workers produce unemployment and vacancies (e.g.
Pissarides, 2000).  In these models, improvements in the matching
technology cause the Beveridge curve to shift in.  Thus the recent
behavior of the Beveridge curve is consistent with the existence of
such improvements, arising for example from the growth of the
temporary help industry.
     Yet we doubt that the Beveridge curve is informative about the33
sources of NAIRU movements.  Although the shift in the curve is
consistent with improved matching technology, it is also consistent
with other explanations for the falling NAIRU.  For example,
suppose the NAIRU falls because workers who do not search hard for
jobs become incarcerated or receive disability benefits and,
therefore, drop out of the labor force.  This reduces unemployment
but has little effect on vacancies, because these workers were
unlikely to fill jobs anyway.  Or suppose the NAIRU falls because
wage aspirations fall relative to productivity growth.  This makes
workers more willing to take jobs when wages are a given level
relative to productivity.  When workers take jobs more readily,
both unemployment and vacancies fall, and again the Beveridge curve
shifts in.  As these examples illustrate, most plausible stories
about a shifting Phillips curve can explain a shifting Beveridge
curve as well.  Thus, the fact that the Beveridge curve shifted
inward after 1985 says little about why NAIRU fell.
     This argument is strengthened by the fact that the Beveridge
curve shifted outward in the 1970s, when the NAIRU rose.  While
some authors suggest that the matching technology has improved
recently, to our knowledge no one has argued that it deteriorated
in the 1970s.  The relationship between Phillips-curve and
Beveridge-curve shifts appears to hold consistently over time, but
it does not tell us much about why these shifts occur.
6. Conclusion 
The NAIRU--or its approximate synonym, the natural rate of34
unemployment--is an important building block of business cycle
theory.  Few economists would deny that shifts in aggregate demand,
such as those driven by monetary policy, push inflation and
unemployment in opposite directions, at least in the short run.
That is all one needs to believe to accept the NAIRU concept.  
The practical application is this concept, however, is less
straightforward.  The value of NAIRU is hard to measure, largely
because it changes over time.  The economy experiences many kinds
of shocks that influence inflation and unemployment.  In light of
this fact, it would be remarkable if the level of unemployment
consistent with stable inflation were easy to measure.
There is no shortage of hypotheses to explain what causes the
NAIRU to change over time and, in particular, why it fell during
the 1990s. The available evidence is too weak to establish
decisively which hypothesis is right, but the literature on the
NAIRU has made progress.  Demography and government policy both
play some role.  In addition, changes in productivity growth appear
to shift the inflation-unemployment tradeoff.  In the past, most
macroeconomists studying the Phillips curve have concentrated their
attention on the dynamic relationship between inflation and
unemployment.  In the future, they should expand their scope to
build and test models of inflation, unemployment, and productivity.35
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